US Secretary of State John Kerry realized long ago that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's emphasis on recognition of Israel as the Jewish nation state by the Palestinians was due to his belief that President Mahmoud Abbas would not be able to comply with this demand. He speculated that Netanyahu would rather blame the Palestinians for the failure of talks than sign a final agreement rife with compromise, and that the strategy represents an update on Netanyahu's 1996 mantra of "if they give - they shall receive."

Even then Netanyahu donned the garments of a peacemaker: all he asked, after all, was that the Palestinians fulfill their part of the bargain. He appointed himself their judge, decided they failed to deliver on their promises, and absolved himself from making good on the interim agreement.

But when Kerry quit his post as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to become Secretary of State, having then decided to tackle head on the longest-standing post-World War II conflict, he adopted a tactic tailor-made for the Israeli prime minister.

Instead of driving the parties toward a set of compromises, in the knowledge that whoever serves as the Israeli is the pivot to resolving the conflict, he sought to understand what was really important to Netanyahu. He stumbled on the following two earth shattering realizations: Palestinian recognition of Israel as the Jewish nation state and, in the interests of security, Israeli control over the West Bank along the Jordan River. He then concluded that if he could provide positive answers to both demands during the bilateral talks between himself and Netanyahu, the Israeli leader will go softly on other key issues, such as the border between Israel and the future Palestinian state, East Jerusalem as the capital of that state, and a solution to the issue of Palestinian refugees.